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I. Introduction
With the enactment of NAFTA, the mouth of the U.S. telecommunications industry
watered as it saw huge prospects by entering into Mexico.' Talk of entering Mexico's
nine billion dollar industry surfaced.2 Now, in 2001, the telecommunications industry is
left scratching its head. Only recently did AT&T and MCI WorldCom settle their dispute
with Mexico's telecommunications giant Telmex.
The dispute arose out of AT&T and MCI WorldCom's desire to provide long dis-
tance service to Mexico. NAFTA, at the time of its enactment, was seen as the great
privatizing force in Mexico's telecommunications industry.3 However, NAFTA had very
little impact in the industry's privatization. Instead, market forces took over the privati-
zation of the telecommunications industry in Mexico. The dispute between AT&T, MCI
WorldCom, and Telmex exposed the inadequacies of NAFTA with regard to Mexico's
telecommunications.
* J.D., St. Mary's University School of Law (2000); LL.M., Southern Methodist University Ded-
man School of Law (2001); Sergio E. Aleman is an associate with the law firm of Buchholz,
Sassin & DeMaio, P.L.L.C., in Dallas, Texas, where he practices commercial and tort litigation.
Mr. Aleman would like to give special thanks to the Wilk Law Office, P.C.
1. See Rafael X. Zahralddin & C. Todd Jones, Venture Capital Opportunities and Mexican
Telecommunications After the Passage of the NAFTA and the Ley de Inversion Extranjera, 20
DEL. J. CORP. L. 899 (1995) (stating that NAFTA and the Foreign Investment Law of Mexico
provided immediate benefits for U.S. industry in Mexico's telecommunications market).
2. See David Newman, Mexico Opens Up: Deregulation Brings Free Trade to Telecom, 24 DATA
COMM. 96 (June 1995).
3. Id.
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Part Two of this article will go through the history of the Telmex privatization. Part
Three will discuss the complaints that the United States launched against Mexico to the
World Trade Organization (WTO). Part Four contains an examination of the NAFTA
provisions directed at telecommunications and their effect on the industry. Furthermore,
Part Five will examine the steps taken by Mexico in opening up its telecommunications
market to competitors. The provisions set out in the WTO Basic Telecommunications
Agreement are discussed in Part Six of this article.
II. History of Telmex
Mexico's telecommunications industry came under government control in 1972.'
The Mexican government created a state-owned company called Telefones de Mexico,
S.A., otherwise known as Telmex.' However, like most state-owned companies, Telmex
became synonymous with inefficiency and corruption.6 Before its privatization, Mexico's
telephone system still consisted of a pulse dial system.7 Often uninvited third parties
involuntarily joined a two-party telephone conversation because of trouble with the
telephone circuits.' Customers who filed complaints with Telmex found it was too much
of a hassle and repairing a phone line usually took more than the twenty-one days that
Telmex had promised its customers.9 During this time, only six per one hundred people
had phone lines.' °
In 1990, under Mexican President Salinas de Gortari, Telmex was privatized. Telmex
was sold to an international consortium made of Southwestern Bell (SBC), France Tele-
com, and Groupo Carso of Mexico.1" Privatizing Telmex was seen as necessary to foster
economic growth, especially in light of the modern information society.'2 As a result,
Mexico's Ministry of Communications and Transportation (SCT), who in the past had
direct control of Telmex, was now reduced to a mere regulatory agency. 3 Telmex was
expressly granted a six-year monopoly by the Mexican government in providing local
and long distance service. 4 Additionally, Telmex was given the power to establish its
own rates for interconnection. This has given Telmex a tremendous advantage because
4. See Brent Lee Vannoy, Comment: Mexican Telecommunications: Privatization and NAFTA
Open the Door for U.S. Expansion into Mexican Markets, 17 Hous. J. INT'L L. 309, 312 (1994).
5. Id.
6. See Gregg Jones, Mexico Invites Foreign Partnership in Phone Co.; Bidding Opened for Privati-




10. United States-Mexico Chamber of Commerce, Telecommunications, Business Opportunities in
Telecommunications (Oct. 1999), at http://www.usmcoc.orgln7.html.
11. Martha M. Hamilton, With Telmex, Profit May Lie in Long Haul; Analysts See Strong Prospects
for Mexico's Telephone Giant, WASH. PosT, Feb. 8, 1995, at COt.
12. Id.
13. See Vannoy, supra note 4, at 317.
14. See Aileen A. Pisciotta, Telecommunications in Mexico: A Market in Transition, MEx. LAW &
Bus. REPORT, Oct. 31, 1997.
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it owns all the telephones lines, which its would-be competitors must access in order to
compete with Telmex.'5
The privatization of Telmex was tainted with cronyism. 6 Carlos Slim, a long-time
friend of then President Salinas, led the consortium. 7 Telmex was sold at a fraction
of its actual value.'" After its so-called "privatization," Telmex raised its local phone
rates drastically.'9 These rate hikes were easily achieved under the government-granted
six-year monopoly because no competition was allowed to counter Telmex's control of
telecommunications. 20
In 1993, Mexico passed its new Foreign Investment Law (FIL), 2' further liberalizing
its telecommunications industry. The FIL limited foreign ownership in basic telephone
service to 49 percent. 22 Furthermore, it allowed for full foreign ownership of value added
services. 23 By 1997, the Telmex monopoly was to be over and the Mexican telecommu-
nications was to be open to competition. 4 Long distance providers got in line to take
advantage of this new opportunity. In 1996, the Mexican government was prepared to
allow six carriers to enter the market and compete with Telmex, some of which included
AT&T's Alestra and MCI's Avantel. 21
These were substantial steps in privatization for Mexico, given Mexico's past fear
of foreign investment. NAFTA was then hailed as the defining moment for privatizing
Mexico's telecommunications industry.26 NAFTA's goal was to eliminate all tariff barri-
ers, including those in the telecommunications industry.27 U.S. domination of Mexico's
telecommunications sector seemed imminent. However, by the end of the year 2000,
Telmex still controlled all of Mexico's local telephone service and two-thirds of the long
distance market. 21 It is also important to note that Telmex accounts for one-fifth of
Mexico's stock market. 29 This gives Telmex great influence on what laws and regulations
the government of Mexico is to implement because of the fear that any such -measures
15. See Stephen I. Glover & JoEllen Lotvedt, The Mexican Telecommunications Market: The Inter-
play of Internal Reform and NAFTA, 3 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REv. AM. 23, 29 (Winter 1997).
16. See Andres Oppenheimer, The Banquet, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
mexico/readings/banquet.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2001).
17. See Luis Granovsky, Untitled, AGENCE-FRANCE, Dec. 10, 1995, at 1995 WL 11483300.
18. Id.
19. See Karen Hansen-Kuhn, Privatization in Mexico: Telmex (April 1997), at http://
www.50years.org/factsheets/telmex.html (explaining that Telmex was allowed to raise prices
to Mexican consumers in order to make the sale of Telmex more attractive).
20. Id.
21. Ley de Inversion Extranjera, D.O. Dec 27, 1993 [hereinafter FILl.
22. FIL art. 7, supra note 21, at 1010.
23. Id., at 1011.
24. See Hamilton, supra note 11.
25. Id.
26. See Zahralddin & Jones, supra note 1, at 932.
27. Canada-Mexico-United States: North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992 (entered
into force Jan. 1, 1994), 32 I.L.M. 289, 296 (Mar. 1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
28. David Luhnow, U.S. Is Set to Ask WTO to Investigate Mexican Telecoms, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12,
2000, at A23.
29. Id.
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will impede the Mexican economy.3" This also gives Telmex a significant advantage in
resisting the rate at which privatization is to take place in Mexico.
Long distance competitors have had to rely on market forces to open the way for
greater privatization of Mexico's telecommunications market, rather than relying on the
provisions in NAFTA. As soon as AT&T and MCI entered the Mexican market, disputes
arose over Telmex's interconnection fees.3 This unveiled the ineffectiveness of NAFTA
with regard to telecommunications. These legal disputes were to last four years.32
III. The WTO Complaint
In 2000, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) decided to file a complaint
with the WTO.33 At the same time, Telmex was trying to enter the U.S. market by allying
itself with Sprint and SBC. 34 Seeing that Telmex was not reducing its rate, the USTR
resorted to trying to block Telmex's expansion into the U.S. market. 3' AT&T and MCI
WorldCom pressured the USTR to file the WTO complaint against Mexico for failure
to open its telecommunications market.36 The complaint was specifically targeted at
the Mexican government and not against Telmex. The complaint essentially raises three
charges, but the main issue of dispute is the high interconnection rates Telmex charged
its competitors.
First, it alleges that Mexico has allowed Telmex to maintain and abuse its position
as the country's dominant carrier of telecommunications services. 37 In fact, Telmex has
actually increased its market share since it was privatized. 38 It accuses the Mexican gov-
ernment of failing to enact regulations that would prohibit Telmex from denying U.S.
competitors access to its phone lines, establishing predatory rates, and refusing to pay
competitors their fees. This goes against the WTO Basic Telecommunications Agreement
discussed below. Secondly, the complaint accuses Mexico of allowing Telmex to charge its
U.S. competitors unreasonable interconnection fees to access Telmex's public networks.39
Although the Comision Federal de Telecomunicaciones (COFETEL), Mexico's telecommu-
nications regulatory agency, has ordered Telmex to cut its fees significantly, these rates
have still been unsatisfactory to U.S. competitors. Related to this charge is the allegation
that U.S. competitors have had to build their own telecommunications infrastructure in
30. Id.
31. See David Luhnow, Telmex, Rivals Trying to Reach Access Accord Before Tuesday, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 7, 2000, at A2 1.
32. See David Luhnow, Telmex to Get $140 Million from Rivals, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2001, at A10.
33. Id.
34. See Elinor Mills, FCC Rejects AT&T Request to Keep Mexican Phone Company out of U.S.
(Aug. 25, 1998), at http://www.nwfusion.com/news/0825telmex.html.
35. Id.
36. See Telmex Reaches Agreement with Two Principal Competitors, SOURCEMEX: ECON. NEWS &
ANALYSIS ON MEX., Jan. 1, 2001, available at 2001 WL 10229481 [hereinafter Telmex Reaches
Agreement].
37. See Kim Sunderland, U.S. Brings Telecom Dispute with Mexico to WTO (Sept. 15, 2000), at
http://www.phoneplusinternational.com/articles/091rnewl.html.
38. Id. Telmex has increased its share of the market from 74% to 81%.
39. Id.
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order to avoid using Telmex. Finally, there is a disagreement on what standard should be
used in setting interconnection fees.4"
There are advantages to bringing a WTO complaint, rather than a NAFTA complaint
against Mexico. The most forceful advantage involves external factors. A WTO complaint
is designed to protect a country's industrial sector as a whole.41 NAFTA only creates a
dispute resolution process between two parties." There are only three signatories under
NAFTA. This dilutes the leverage that political pressure brings to another member state.
A state involved in the dispute may also enlist other Member States that have similar
concerns about the outcome of a trade dispute.43 This puts significant political pressure
on a party with adverse interests.
Another major advantage in bringing a complaint to the WTO is that its provisions
over a wide range of subjects have already been tested.44 Although WTO panel decisions
cannot set precedent, they do provide for transparency and stability in trade disputes.4"
In contrast, NAFTAs dispute resolution provisions are relatively new and have only
been tested in certain areas.46 Furthermore, it may be the practice of a NAFTA dispute
resolution panel to look at prior WTO panel decisions for guidance.
47
In Mexico's case, worry spread throughout Mexico as a result of the USTR's actions.
Mexico's economic growth was due, in most part, to foreign investment.4 A VTO com-
plaint might scare off foreign investors who may see Mexico as incapable of providing
a transparent system for doing business. 49 Also, both AT&T and MCI had threatened to
pull millions of dollars in investments out of Mexico.5" Mexico, in fear of the effects of
such a pull out, decided to try and negotiate a settlement. These types of market forces
have privatized Mexico's telecommunications industry.
IV. NAFTA
NAFTA does little to protect U.S. long distance providers because it does not
specifically cover investment in basic telecommunications, which includes long distance
service. 51
40. Id.
41. See David A. Gantz, Dispute Settlement Under the NAFTA and the WTO: Choice of Forum
Opportunities and Risks for the NAFTA Parties, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1025, 1088 (1999)
(stating that the WTO provides for broader "peer pressure" for compliance to the WTO
provisions).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1044.




48. See John Ward Anderson, MCI, AT&T Find Mexico a Bad Connection; Nation's Former
Monopoly Phone Firm Proves Tough Rival to U.S. Giants in Deregulated Market, WASH. POST,
Feb. 2, 1998, at GO.
49. Id.
50. See Vannoy, supra note 4, at 328.
51. Id.
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NAFTA allows each member to restrict foreign ownership in basic telecommunica-
tions services and their availability to international competition.52 Furthermore, NAFTA
fails to protect a carrier's ability to interconnect to domestic networks. 53 NAFTA does
have provisions directly addressing access to networks and services, but these provisions
are undermined by the exceptions allowed to the NAFTA signatories.54 These exceptions
allow a member nation to restrict access to networks when public safety is involved, to
ensure integrity of the telecommunications system, and to secure the privacy of indi-
viduals.55 The overall effect of these exceptions is that NAFTA fails to protect a carrier's
right to interconnect to a public network.
NAFTA does dedicate itself to protecting enhanced telecommunications services.56
Enhanced telecommunications includes things such as voice mail, facsimiles, electronic
communications, and pages. These enhanced telecommunications services can be domes-
tic or international.57 NAFTA states that these services must be provided on a reasonable
and nondiscriminatory basis.5 Any restrictions must be narrowly tailored so that the
objectives of the restrictions are to provide safety and efficiency. NAFTA also requires
that any regulations be transparent with regard to enhanced telecommunications.59
The provisions covering enhanced telecommunications have had little effect on the
telecommunications industry. Even with the backwardness of Telmex's technology, and
U.S. hopes to enter Mexico and provide it with more advanced equipment, Telmex
remained strong despite NAFTA. Telmex charged interconnection fees to its long distance
competitors needing access to Telmex's local phone network.60 The charges consisted of
U.S. companies paying nineteen cents per minute if calls originated outside Mexico and
4.6 cents per minute if the calls originated within Mexico. 6' This is in contrast to the
six cents per minute that other countries charge to long distance providers. 62 What U.S.
companies also perceived unfair is that most calls originate in the United States and not
in Mexico.63 Telmex justified these high interconnection fees on the grounds that such
fees were needed to modernize its telecommunications system. 64 As a result, AT&T's and
MCI's joint venture companies had to give more than 70 percent of their revenues to
Telmex. 65 With the excuse of trying to modernize the telecommunications standards in
52. Id.
53. See NAFTA, supra note 27, art. 904.
54. Id. art. 1301.
55. Id. art. 1302.
56. Id. art. 1303.
57. Id.
58. See NAFTA, supra note 27, art. 1302.
59. Id. art. 1303.
60. See Vineeta Shetty, Fight Club, COMM. INT'L 4852, Jan. 1, 2001, available at 2001 WL
11534630.




64. See Telmex Reaches Agreement, supra note 36.
65. See Anderson, supra note 48.
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Mexico, as required by NAFTA, Telmex was able to maintain a de facto monopoly.66
As late as 1999, Telmex's cellular subsidiary, Telcel, controlled 60 percent of the cellular
phone market. Telmex's prior monopoly in the cellular industry helped Telcel hold onto
its dominance in the market.
67
The same holds true with regard to "enhanced" telecommunications. Although
NAFTA's provisions have helped some in opening up the "enhanced" telecommunica-
tions industry, it will be up to market forces to further achieve privatization. Telcel's
dominance has been, in most part, due to Telmex's inefficiency. Mexican consumers
opted for cellular phones because they were dissatisfied with Telmex's basic services. 6
Market forces will play a greater role in privatization as foreign competition enters the
market with better service and technology.
Furthermore, NAFTAs "enhanced" telecommunications distinction between "basic
services" and "enhanced services" will become illusory.69 As one commentator points
out, "Value-added services depend on basic services, and in many ways, the two are
becoming one.'7 Such distinctions in NAFTA between "enhanced" telecommunications
and basic services are doomed to fail as technology in the telecommunications industry
advances.7 As advances in telecommunications technology continue to grow, it will be
up to the market and the telecommunications industry to make sure that these services
are available and accessible.
Along with NAFTA came the promise of standardization in telecommunications
technology.72 NAFTA eliminated non-tariff barriers that were used to protect domestic
industries.73 Elimination of non-tariff barriers is especially important in the telecom-
munications industry because the incompatibility between two products prevent foreign
investment and competitors from entering the market.74 NAFTA orders its signatories to
make their products compatible in order to facilitate trade.7" The compatibility standards
for a product are to be judged by international standards.76
NAFTA's international standardization provisions provide no real guidance and have
had little effect on the telecommunications industry. International communications stan-
dards are established by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the
66. See Julia Preston, Competitors of Telmex Say It Still Acts Like a Monopoly, N.Y. TIMES
ABSTRACTS, Apr. 4, 2000, at 4, available at 2000 WL 21711770.




69. See Vannoy, supra note 4, at 328.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Karen E. Lee, Note: Cooperative Standard-Setting: The Road to Compatibility or Deadlock?
The NAFTA's Transformation of the Telecommunications Industry, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 487, 488
(1996) (arguing that NAFTA's goal in reducing different product standards is hindered by the
numerous problems faced by international standard-setting organizations).
73. See NAFTA, supra note 27, art. 904.
74. See Lee, supra note 72, at 494.
75. See NAFTA, supra note 27, art. 904.
76. Id. art. 905.
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International Organization for Standardization (ISO)." 7 However, as one commentator
points out, these two international bodies have inherent flaws. First, there is the problem
of delay.78 These organizations often take too long in procuring new standards because of
the bureaucratic procedures involved in establishing these standards.79 Second, countries
are reluctant to follow these international standards. 80 These countries are fearful of for-
eign investors taking over their telecommunications industry and rather offer protection
to their local telecommunications industry.
81
However, the broad language of NAFTAs mandatory international standardization
provisions may be beneficial, since it leaves it up to industry officials to fill in the gap with
"self-help" measures.82 The testing standards for terminal attachment equipment such as
telephones, facsimiles, and modems are the same in the United States and Canada, but
fail to meet Mexican standards. As a result, the U.S. telecommunications industry can-
not compete in Mexico. Additionally, compliance with Mexican standards becomes more
costly.8  This problem has been raised by one commentator in the context of terminal
attachment equipment. 84 This potential for dispute was foreseen by the telecommunica-
tions industry and prompted industry representatives from all three NAFTA members to
come together in 1997 to try and harmonize these standards.
8 5
V. Mexican Law
National laws were more effective than NAFTA in privatizing Mexico's telecommu-
nications industry. As mentioned, NAFTA does not address cross-border services and
foreign investment in basic communications. However, Mexico did choose to change
its foreign investment laws. In 1993, Mexico passed its Foreign Investment Law (FIL),
which, as mentioned, now allows 49 percent investment in wireline services and 100 per-
cent foreign ownership in cellular and private leased lines.8 6 Before the FIL, all foreign
ownership of Mexican companies was limited to 49 percent.8
7
77. See Lee, supra note 72, at 495.
78. Id. at 497.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 502.
81. Id.
82. See California Technology, Trade & Commerce Agency, Case Study-Telecommunications, at
http://www.commerce.ca.gov/international/nafta/Telecomm.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2000).
83. See Glover & Lotvedt, supra note 15, at 28.
84. Id. (describing that unlike a Mexican manufacturer of terminal attachment equipment, a U.S.
supplier of terminal attachment equipment must undergo mandatory inspections and is not
allowed to share product certification; meeting with these Mexican requirements is a very
costly process).
85. See Case Study--Telecommunications, supra note 82.
86. See FIL, supra note 21, at 1010.
87. See Zahralddin & Jones, supra note 1, at 907 (providing a brief history on Mexico's past for-
eign investment laws and regulations, which were designed to reconstruct Mexico's economy
and to build up domestic industries).
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Mexico's Secretariet for Communications and Transport (SCT) designed the laws
that were to privatize the telecommunications industry."8 It enacted the laws that pri-
vatized Telmex. Another independent agency within the SCT was created to further
oversee Mexico's privatization of the telecommunications industry; this was COFETEL."9
COFETEL is charged with overseeing the newly privatized telecommunications sector.90
Additionally, COFETEL is responsible for implementing and enforcing regulations that
affect competition. 91 COFETEL has, on several occasions, ordered Telmex to reduce its
interconnection rates. 92 COFETEL has reduced long distance tariffs by half during the
period 1996 through 1999. 93 But these measures have not been enough for U.S. long
distance providers and Telmex has resisted any such regulations by COFETEL.94
In January 2001, U.S. companies came into an agreement with the Mexican govern-
ment over the interconnection fees. Under this agreement all legal actions by the parties
involved must stop, including the WTO complaint launched against the Mexican govern-
ment.95 The interconnection rate would be at 1.25 cents per minute.96 The year before the
rate was 3.36 cents per minute.9 This new rate is now similar to rates that other countries
charge long distance providers.98 Lower rates had been set by COFETEL in the past, but
Telmex had resisted such rates with legal tactics in order to delay and stop the regulations
setting these rates from ever taking effect.99 Additionally, AT&T and MCI WorldCom
agreed to pay Telmex $450 million for past fees they had not paid due to the dispute.'00
VI. The WTO Basic Telecommunications Agreement
The complaint launched by the United States against Mexico was based on allega-
tions that Mexico failed to comply with the WTO's Basic Telecommunications Services
Agreement (Basic Telecom Agreement), which was signed in 1997.20 The Basic Telecom
88. See Glover & Lotvedt, supra note 15, at 24.
89. See Pisciotta, supra note 14.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Graham Gori, Taking on the Corporate Goliaths, N.Y. TIMES ABSTRACTS, Oct. 29, 2000,
at 12, available at 2001 WL 31869913.
93. See Shetty, supra note 60.
94. See Anthony DePalma, U.S. Seeks W.TO. Talks on Mexican Phone Market, N.Y. TiMES
ABSTRACTS, Oct. 29, 2000, at C2, available at 2000 WL 25027095 (the dissatisfaction by U.S.
companies has been the inability by Mexican regulatory agencies to enforce the measures
they have passed against Telmex).
95. See Telmex Reaches Agreement, supra note 36.
96. id.
97. See Luhnow, supra note 31.
98. id.
99. See Telmex Reaches Agreement, supra note 36.
100. Id.
101. The results of the WTO Basic Telecommunications Services April 30, 1996 negotiations are
incorporated into the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) by the Fourth Protocol
to the GATS, 36 I.L.M. 366 (1997).
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Agreement essentially makes the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) appli-
cable to the telecommunications sector.'
0 2
As its name implies, the purpose of the agreement is to open domestic basic telecom-
munications markets to competitors. Under the Basic Telecom Agreement, nations must
afford most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment to foreign competitors in accord with the
GATS.' °3 MFN status means that a host country must treat foreign suppliers as they
would treat their own domestic suppliers."°4 The agreement covers voice telephone ser-
vices, facsimiles, telex, packet switched data transmissions services, and circuit switched
data transmissions services.'05 It also includes the modes of supplying these services.
This covers long distance telecommunications where: (1) VTO member foreign suppli-
ers offer their services to consumers of other nationals of another WTO member, (2)
foreign suppliers deliver their services through a local agent in that host country, and
(3) foreign suppliers deliver their services directly in that host country.0 6
In order to ensure that the provisions of the Basic Telecom Agreement are imple-
mented, the signatories agreed in writing to open their telecommunications industry
to competition. These commitments are spelled out in what is called the "Reference
Paper."'0 7 Unlike NAFTA, these provisions are specifically designed to protect long dis-
tance service providers like AT&T and MCI WorldCom °8
When competitors enter a domestic market, they are to be ensured fair and nondis-
criminatory treatment. 0 9 National governments must enact laws and regulations that
ensure that their local state monopoly does not abuse its dominant position."0 Also,
they are to pass measures requiring their local monopoly to provide interconnection
to competitors, and that such interconnection rates are transparent and nondiscrimi-
natory."' If a dispute between the new competitors and the local monopoly arises, an
independent regulatory agency must take care of the dispute." 2 In order to ensure that
102. See Kelley Drye & Aileen A. Pisciotta, Navigating New Telecom Trade Routes: The WTO Basic
Telecommunication Agreement, The Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, 1997, as cited on Nexus,
October 1997.
103. Id.
104. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay
Round): General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Article XVII, 33 I.L.M. 44 (1994).
105. See Drye & Pisciotta, supra note 102.
106. Id.
107. See Reference Paper, Apr. 30, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 367, 369 (1997). The Reference Paper contains
principles relating to competition safeguards, interconnection, universal service, transparency
of licensing criteria, independence of the regulator, and allocation of scarce resources. The
WTO Secretariat distributed the Reference Paper, but never formally issued it as a WTO
document. The text has been published in 36 I.L.M. 367 (1997).
108. See Laura B. Sherman, "Wildly Enthusiastic" About the First Multilateral Agreement on Trade
in Telecommunications Services, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 61 (Dec. 1998).
109. See John J. Alissi, Revolutionizing the Telephone Industry: The World Trade Organization Agree-
ment on Basic Telecommunications and the Federal Communications Commission Order, 13





the regulatory agency is fair and neutral, the agreement calls for the regulatory agency
to not be affiliated with any supplier of basic telecommunication services."
3
Although the Basic Telecom Agreement is far more sweeping in the privatization
of telecommunications, it is also similar to NAFTA in that the Reference Paper does
not specify what measures are to be taken. Instead, it leaves these specifications to the
individual signatories to implement."' Additionally, restrictions on market access are
allowed for monopoly telecommunications providers." 5 Furthermore, restrictions are
allowed on foreign ownership and the number of competitors.1 6 More importantly, the
WTO fails to establish standards for basing interconnection rates. 1 7 As it stands now,
under Mexican law, interconnection fees are to be negotiated individually."' This has
been the case with Telmex and its competitors."' Given Telmex's dominant position, high
interconnection rates will obviously favor Telmex. The United States favors international
interconnection fees, but Mexico prefers to adhere to a "mathematical model." '2 Overall,
the Basic Telecom Agreement is more specific in that it mentions long distance providers.
However, its broad goals and its failure to specify what measures are to be taken make
it susceptible to dispute. 21
VII. Conclusion
With regard to telecommunications, the advantages of an agreement such as NAFTA
are that it establishes goals for its members to accomplish and it sets the stage for change
to take place. However, it does not provide the means for how change is to take place.
Much talk and praise was given to NAFTA, but upon a closer look at NAFTAs broad
language, exceptions, and allowances for reservations,'there was an apparent dilution as
to any substantial impact it was to provide the telecommunications industry.
In contrast, a more detailed agreement such as the Basic Telecom Agreement pro-
vided incentives and enforcement mechanisms to help open the telecommunications
market of countries that in the past had relied on monopolies for their telecommunica-
tions services. Even so, it too contained broad language that left a void as to intercon-
nection rates.
The privatization of Mexico's telecommunications industry will continue to progress,
but not thanks to NAFTA. External forces will achieve this extended privatization.
113. Id.
114. See Sherman, supra note 108, at 77.
115. See Sunderland, supra note 37.
116. Id.
117. See Alissi, supra note 109, at 496.
118. See Sunderland, supra note 37.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Alissi, supra note 109, at 503-04 (explaining that the FCC issued an order to reduce
settlement rates in order to fill the void left by the WTO Basic Telecom Agreement with
regard to settlement rates. As a result, foreign countries protested arguing that the FCC order
discriminates against foreign telecommunication carriers).
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Mexico's new president has said all the right things to satisfy the telecommunications
industry in the United States because he seems committed to further open competi-
tion. "'22 National laws will eventually determine the nature of Mexico's privatization and
its regulatory agencies because telecommunications can only go as far as national law
allows it.
The leading "trailblazer" in accessing new telecommunications markets has been
the market itself. Traditional business practices combined with industry and political
pressure has taken its toll on Mexico and Telmex. NAFTA has only had an indirect
impact on the telecommunications industry in Mexico. In contrast, one must ask what
message would have been sent had AT& T and MCI WorldCom pulled out of investing
in Mexico. Such withdrawal or trade sanctions by the WTO would have created a cause
for alarm in Mexico.
122. Jim Cicconi, News Release, AT&T, AT&T Strongly Supports USTR Action Requesting WTO
Consultations with Mexico for Failure to Meet Trade Commitments (July 28, 2000), at
http://www.att.com/press/item/0,1354,3154,00.html.
